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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PETTY MOTOR LEASE, INC,, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
CLARENCE L. JOLLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
See Brief of Defendant-Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
See Brief of Defendant-Appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant prays for affirmation of the 
trial court's determination that the Plaintiff-Respondent 
and Cross Appellant should not be awarded its attorney's 
fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Appellant does not disagree with the 
Statement of Facts as set forth in the Brief of Plaintiff-
Cross Appellant, except for the Plaintiff's characterization, 
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analysis or criticism of the evidence. However, there is 
one additional fact which is not stated in the Brief of 
Plaintiff-Cross Appellant. The agreement regarding the pur-
chase of the three leased vehicles and the Telegift Internatioc-
al stock, designated as "Agreement" and introduced as Exhibit 
1-P, does not provide for payment of attorney's fees to the 
Plaintiff-Cross Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S 
FEES WAS PROPER, AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
BY THE INSTANT COURT: 
The Plaintiff in its complaint alleged the following: 
The lease agreements provide for the payment of costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiff 
in the enforcement of its rights under the lease 
agreements. Plaintiff has been forced to hire coun-
sel by Defendant's actions, and a reasonable fee to 
be awarded to Plaintiff for the use and benefit of 
its attorney herein, is in the sum of $ 2, 000. 00. (R.ll 
In his answer to the Plaintiff's complaint, the Defendant admit:' 
this allegation. The Plaintiff contends that this admission co'· 
stitutes an admission that the Plaintiff should be entitled to 
attorney's fees in this action. However, this is not the case. 
In its conclusions of law, the trial court held: 
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The agreements of June 24, 1971, constitute a 
sales contract, and the leases are merged into the 
sales contract. (R. 39) 
Thus the Court held that the three lease agreements and the 
sales contract constituted one contract. While the Defendant 
admitted that the three lease agreements standing alone provide 
for attorney's fees, the Defendant did not admit that the merged 
lease agreements and sales agreement constituted a contract 
which provides for the Plaintiff's attorney's fees. 
Since it cannot be said that Defendant admitted that 
the Plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees under the merged 
contract, the instant Court must look to the trial court's 
findings of fact in determining whether the Plaintiff is en-
titled to attorney's fees. In looking at the findings of fact, 
the trial court made no finding that the Plaintiff was entitled 
to attorney's fees and therefore it must be assumed that the 
trial court found against the Plaintiff on this issue of fact. 
The rules governing the construction of contemporan-
eous instruments was aptly stated in 17 Am. Jur. 2d. Contracts 
§264, p. 670: 
Construing contemporaneous instruments together 
means simply that if trere are any provisions in 
one instrument limiting, explaining, or other-
wise affecting the provisions of another, they 
will be given effect as between the parties them-
selves and all persons charged with notice, so 
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that the intention of the parties may be carried 
out, and the whole agreement actually made may be 
effectuated. 
In Berry vs. Crouse (Mo.) 376 SW 2d 107, 111, the court in con-
struing contemporaneous instrwnents stated the rule as follows: 
Correctly stated, the rule is that where two 
consistent contracts are executed as part of 
the same transaction, they should be read and 
considered together in order to ascertain the 
intention of the parties. 
From the foregoing, it is evident that the determination of 
whether contemporaneous instrwnents should be merged into one 
contract is a question of fact in the trial court. Thus, the 
question of whether merged instrwnents provide for attorney's 
fees would also be a question of fact. 
In the instant case, the trial court found against 
the Plaintiff on the factual issue of whether the merged agree-
ments provide for attorney's fees. Under the usual rule of 
appellate review, the trial court's findings of fact will not 
be overturned if there is substantial evidence to support the 
findings. First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Company, 
27 Ut. 2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971). Certainly, the fact that 
the sale agreement does not provide for attorney's fees is sub-
stantial evidence to support the trial court's determination 
that the instrwnents merged into one contract do not provide 
for attorney's fees. 
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The foregoing is respectfully submitted. 
LORIN N. PACE 
RANDALL BUNNELL 
431 South Third East, B-1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I CERTIFY that I mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing REPLY 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT to Wayne G. Petty of Moyle and 
Draper, 600 Deseret Plaza, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Attor-
neys for Plaintiff-Respondent, this 31st day of March, 1978, 
postage prepaid. 
RANDALL BUNNELL 
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